


























Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 

















Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. 
This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents 
are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process that generates an 
influence network, and they use simple rules to decide whether to adopt or not depending on the observed 
sample. We characterize, as a function of the primitives of the model, the diffusion threshold (i.e., the 
spreading rate above which the adoption of the new behavior becomes persistent in the population) and 
the endemic state (i.e., the fraction of adopters in the stationary state of the dynamics). We find that the 
new behavior will easily spread in the population if there is a high correlation between how influential 
(visible) and how easily influenced an agent is, which is determined by the sampling process and the 
adoption rule. We also analyze how the density and variance of the out-degree distribution affect the 
diffusion threshold and the endemic state. 
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author. 1 Introduction
The proliferation of internet-based communication and interactivity over the past decade
has led to new consumer patterns, innovative marketing approaches, and even uncon-
ventional ways of running political campaigns (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin, 2004, Salganick
et al., 2006, Willimas and Gulati, 2008). A central assumption underlying these new
strategies is that individuals in￿ uence each other when making decisions. Other relevant
social phenomena such as crime activities, religious fundamentalism, cultural fads, life-
style habits, or even epidemics also share this logic (e.g., Aguirre et al., 1988, Glaeser
et al., 1996, Young and Burke, 2001). As a result we have witnessed the arousal of a
tremendous interest in the study of social networks, leading some to herald the arrival of
a "science of networks" (e.g., Watts, 2007).
This paper analyzes how social in￿ uence determines the spread of new behaviors in an
interconnected society, a question that lies at the foundations of the theory of networks
(see, e.g., Goyal, 2007, Vega-Redondo, 2007, Jackson, 2008). A distinctive feature of
this work will be to consider a reiterative sampling process, thus leading to an evolving
in￿ uence network, rather than assuming a ￿xed network of interactions, as it happens in
most of the related literature. In doing so, we shall aim to develop a tractable theoretical
model that could help the testing of speci￿c predictions.1
As people may di⁄er in the information they posses regarding the behavior of others,
we introduce heterogeneity in our model by assigning to each agent an out-degree (or
information level) indicating the number of agents observed by them before making a
decision. We de￿ne a dynamic process in which agents repeatedly sample from the pop-
ulation a subset of agents, observe their choices regarding the new behavior, and decide
whether or not to adopt. The in￿ uence network so determined speci￿es who is in￿ uenced
by whom at di⁄erent time periods. We make two crucial assumptions with respect to the
sampling process. On one hand, it is assumed that sampling is directional, i.e., agent i
sampling agent j does not necessarily imply that j samples i.2 On the other hand, some
agents are sampled more often than others (i.e., are more ￿visible￿ ) and this is related
to their out-degree in a way speci￿ed by the sampling process. More precisely, apart
1Many papers dealing with di⁄usion on ￿xed networks (although randomly generated) are theoretically
intractable and thus rely on extensive simulations studies or mean-￿eld approximations of the models
(e.g., Pastor-SatorrÆs and Vespignani, 2001,Watts, 2002, Watts and Dodds, 2007, Jackson and Rogers,
2007, and L￿pez-Pintado, 2008a).
2Internet plays a crucial role in generating such directed in￿ uence structures (e.g., individuals with
popular websites or blogs who are observed by many others but do not necessarily observe many others).
2from out-degree, agents are characterized by their in-degree, that is, the number of agents
sampling them. The correlation between in-degree (or visibility level) and out-degree
(information level) is determined by the sampling process as described below.
The family of sampling processes considered encompasses a wide variety of options
characterized by a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1], which determines the correlation existing between
the out-degree and the in-degree. For ease of exposition, two polar (and extreme) cases
are singled out. First, the case in which all agents are equally visible (￿ = 0). Here,
agents sample uniformly from the population according to their variable out-degrees.
Second, the situation in which an agent￿ s in-degree is perfectly aligned with her out-
degree (￿ = 1). In other words, an agent with out-degree k is k times more visible than
an agent with out-degree 1. When ￿ = 1 the model essentially coincides with the mean-
￿eld approximation of an (undirected) random network model (e.g., Pator-SatorrÆs and
Vespignani, 2001, Jackson and Rogers, 2007 and L￿pez-Pintado, 2008a). The current
work, thus, helps understand the extent and nature of such approximations. The case
￿ = 0 resembles the model introduced by Galeotti and Goyal (2009). These authors also
use a directed sampling process to analyze the optimal targeting strategy of a ￿rm who
wants to introduce a new product in a population anticipating the e⁄ect of word of mouth.
In our model, agents use simple rules to decide whether or not to adopt the new
behavior. The probability of adopting depends exclusively on the number of adopters and
non-adopters in an agent￿ s sample, and not on who speci￿cally has adopted. Apart from
this simpli￿cation, the class of rules analyzed here is quite general and expands models
described in previous work. For instance, in the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS)
model, enunciated by epidemiologists to analyze the spread of a disease in a population
(e.g., Bailey, 1975), a susceptible agent becomes infected at a constant rate from each
interaction with an infected agent, whereas the transition from infected to susceptible
depends on an exogenous rate of recovery. As a result, the adoption rule exclusively
depends on the absolute number of infected interactions. We extend the SIS model to
allow for more general adoption rules (e.g., rules that depend on the relative number of
adopters) capturing features in the process of adoption that might not be relevant for the
di⁄usion of a disease, but that seem fundamental for di⁄usion of behavior or information
(see also L￿pez-Pintado, 2008a).3
3Alternatively, several authors have addressed the issue of strategic interactions and networks incor-
porating incomplete information and characterizing the Nash-Bayes equilibrium of the resulting network
game. These models assume that agents know their own degree and the degree distribution of the popu-
lation, but have incomplete information about the precise structure of the social network in which they
3In this paper we present an evolving in￿ uence network model and analyze the long-run
state of the adoption dynamics. We characterize the di⁄usion threshold (i.e., the value for
the spreading rate of the new behavior above which adoption by a signi￿cant fraction of
the population occurs) providing its closed-form solution. We also (implicitly) characterize
the endemic fraction of adopters (i.e., the fraction of adopters in the stationary state of
the dynamics) and perform a comparative static analysis. Roughly speaking, we ￿nd that
the new behavior will easily spread in the population if there is a high correlation between
how in￿ uential (visible) and how easily in￿ uenced an agent is, which is determined by the
sampling process and the adoption rule. We also analyze how the density and variance of
the out-degree distribution a⁄ect the di⁄usion threshold and the endemic state. To this
end, we mostly focus on the extreme case where ￿ = 0 and compare the performance of
populations characterized by out-degree distributions ordered according to First Order
Stochastic Dominance and Mean Preserving Spread.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents
the results of the paper, whereas Section 4 concludes. For a smooth passage we defer all
the proofs to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The In￿ uence Network
There is a unit measure of agents N = [0;1]. Each agent i 2 N is characterized by her out-
degree ki which determines the number of agents whose behavior i observes (and hence
is in￿ uenced by). Some agents have more access to information than others or simply
wish to make a more informed decision. Therefore, we assume that the population is
characterized by an out-degree distribution denoted by P(k).4 Let us de￿ne the in-degree
are embedded As in this paper, the results crucially depend on the degree distribution (see e.g., Jackson
and Yariv, 2007 for a dynamic approach and Galeotti et al. 2010 for a static approach). Young (2009)
also analyzes di⁄usion of behavior in a population but, unlike what we do here, he builds on the literature
initiated by Granovetter (1978) and studies the case where agents are heterogenous with respect to the
adoption rule but homogeneous with respect to their (out-) degree. Moreover, instead of concentrating
on the stationary state of the dynamics as we do in this paper, he focuses on the evolution over time of
the fraction of adopters.
4For simplicity in some of the proofs, let us assume that P(k) has a ￿nite support and that the degree
of agents is at least 3. More precisely, P(k) = 0 if either k ￿ 2 or k ￿ K, where K is a ￿nite upperbound
of degrees.
4(or visibility) of an agent as the number of agents sampling this agent. The model takes
as primitives the out-degree distribution and a certain sampling process which determines
the in-degree. The family of sampling processes considered allows for a wide variety of
options, each associated to a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]. Formally, the ￿-sampling process





Note that, if ￿ = 0, this probability becomes P(k). In this case, agents are selected
completely at random and thus the probability of observing an agent with out-degree
k is simply the fraction of agents with such an out-degree. We refer to this situation
as the homogeneous-visibility case, since in this context all agents would have the same
in-degree. 5 If, on the other hand, ￿ = 1 then agents with out-degree equal to k also have
in-degree equal to k. We refer to this situation, in which the visibility level is perfectly
aligned with information level as the information-visibility case. 6
We can then de￿ne an in￿uence network as a result of combining an out-degree dis-
tribution and a sampling process. Formally, the P￿-in￿uence network is the network
obtained when the ￿-sampling process described above is imposed to a population with
out-degree distribution P(k).
2.2 The Adoption Rule
Assume the existence of a new behavior (or product) spreading in a population over time.
In a given period t, agents can either be active or passive with respect to this behavior.
Let i be a passive agent with out-degree ki. Assume that at a spreading rate ￿ ￿ 0 an
5Galeotti and Goyal (2009) analyze a similar framework although with signi￿cant di⁄erences. First of
all, they focus on the targeting strategy of a ￿rm, which has incomplete information about the network
structure, and thus can only rely on the out-degree distribution to estimate the returns associated with
each possible strategy. In our model there is no explicit ￿rm and therefore no intentional targeting strategy
(although one could easily include similar features). Second, whereas we analyze the whole process of
information transmission, Galeotti and Goyal (2009) mostly focus on the case where information only
spreads over two periods. Finally, we assume that becoming an adopter is a reversible decision (see the
description of the adoption rule in Section 2.2), whereas in Galeotti and Goyal (2009) the decision is
irreversible.
6The case ￿ = 1 is such that out-degrees coincide with in-degrees, however, this does not imply
that agents observe each other as it occurs in an undirected network framework. This is an additional
assumption implicit in a mean-￿eld approximation approach commonly used in the epidemiology literature
which had not yet been pointed out.
5agent considers the possibility of adopting the new behavior. To make a decision she
samples ki agents following the sampling process de￿ned above. Assume there are ai
active agents sampled by i at t.7 The rate of adoption of i is given by fki(ai), where
fki(￿) is what we de￿ne as the adoption rule.8 Formally, an adoption rule is a function
fki : [0;1;2:::ki] ! R+ satisfying two conditions:
(1) fki is non-decreasing
(2) fki(0) = 0
Condition (1) implies that the rate of adoption increases with the number of adopters.9
Condition (2) implies that in order to adopt one needs to sample at least one agent who
has already done so.
We assume that an active agent becomes passive again at some constant rate ￿ > 0,
which is independent of the behavior of others. Let us de￿ne the e⁄ective spreading rate
by ￿ = ￿
￿ which will be one of the crucial parameters of the model. Note that the higher
the value of ￿ the more contagious the behavior is.
A plausible interpretation for the transition from passive to active is the following.
At an exogenous rate ￿ any given agent i becomes interested in adopting the behavior or
product (e.g., due to the objective quality of the product, or the presence of mass media
advertisements). The agent￿ s ￿nal decision, however, depends critically on the in￿ uence
exerted by the agents in her sample characterized by the adoption rule fki(ai). We can
assume that the product is not inde￿nitely durable and it becomes obsolete at a certain
rate ￿.10
Two types of adoption rules are singled out:
(1) Viral rules. These adoption rules depend exclusively on the absolute number of
adopters, i.e., fk(a) = fk0(a) for all k and k0. The so-called SIS model of di⁄usion studied
in epidemiology (e.g., Pastor-SatorrÆs and Vespignani, 2001) simply corresponds to a viral
7For ease of notation we avoid now the subscript t that will be included later once the dynamics is
speci￿ed.
8We de￿ne rates instead of probabilities because we consider a continuous time dynamics. The intuition
should be that in a small increment of time dt, the probability of adopting the product is ￿fki(ai)dt.
9In doing so, we are implicitly assuming the existence of incentives for coordination on the same action.
The opposite phenomenon, i.e., the existence of incentives to "anticoordinate" has also been analyzed
elsewhere (e.g., BramoullØ and Kranton, 2007, L￿pez-Pintado, 2008b).
10Alternatively, we could have assumed that the transition from active to passive also depends on the
behavior of others. This assumption has been considered in related models of di⁄usion where, unlike
what has been assumed here, an agent￿ s choice in a certain period does not depend on whether the agent
is currently active or passive, but exclusively on the behavior of neighbors (e.g., L￿pez-Pintado, 2006,
2008b, Watts, 2002 and Jackson and Yariv, 2006).
6rule where adoption depends linearly on the number of infected agents in the sample, i.e.,
fk(a) = a.
(2) Persuasive rules. These adoption rules depend on the relative number of adopters
and thus fk(a) can actually be reinterpreted as a function of a
k. These rules represent
situations where there is some persuasion in favor and against adoption by adopters and
non-adopters, respectively. A stylized case which lies in this category is the Imitation
rule, where an agent simply chooses randomly one of her sampled agents and imitates her
behavior. In such a case fk(a) = a
k.
2.3 The Adoption Dynamics and the Stationary States
Let ￿k(t) denote the frequency of active agents among those with out-degree k at time
t. Thus, ￿(t) =
P
k
P(k)￿k(t) is the total frequency of active agents in the population at









k (t) is the rate at which a passive agent with out-degree k becomes active
and rate1!0
k (t) stands for the reverse transition. As mentioned above rate1!0
k (t) = ￿. As
for rate0!1
k (t) we need a piece of additional notation. Let ￿(t) be the probability that a








where, for simplicity, we denote hk￿i =
P
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= ￿￿k(t)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿k(t))￿rk(￿):
In a stationary state
d￿
k(t)





7Combining (1) and (2) we obtain the following ￿xed-point equation whose solutions
correspond to the stationary values of ￿ (denoted by ￿
￿)























Recall that the transition from active to passive is always possible. Therefore, the
concept of a stationary state only refers to stationary values of ￿ and ￿ and not to the
identities of the agents choosing each action.
3 Results
In this section, we determine the threshold for the e⁄ective spreading rate above which
di⁄usion to a positive fraction of the population occurs. Formally, let A￿ be the set
of e⁄ective spreading rates for which an in￿nitely small fraction of initial active agents
spreads the behavior to a positive fraction of the population. In other words, ￿ belongs to
A￿ if a ￿nite number of of initial adopters can spread the behavior to an in￿nite number
of agents. Then, we de￿ne the di⁄usion threshold ￿
￿as the highest lower bound of such a
set, i.e., ￿
￿ = inf A￿.11
The following lemma, which is interesting on its own, will be used to characterize the
di⁄usion threshold.
Lemma 1 The expected in-degree of an agent with out-degree k in a P￿-in￿uence network
is given by k￿
hk￿ihki.
This result formally establishes the relationship between the number of agents an
agent is in￿ uenced by (out-degree) and the number of agents in￿ uenced by this agent
(in-degree). This lemma shows, in particular, that if ￿ = 0 (homogeneous-visibility case)
all agents are (in expected terms) equally in￿ uential (or visible) and, thus, the expected
number of individuals in￿ uenced by any given agent is hki. If ￿ = 1 (information-visibility
11Note that if A￿ = ? then ￿
￿ = 1
8case), however, the expected number of individuals in￿ uenced by an individual coincides
with her out-degree. Finally, if ￿ lies somewhere in between 0 and 1, there exists a positive
correlation between in and out-degree, but this correlation is not perfect. 12
The main result of this section comes next.








Note that the di⁄usion threshold depends on the adoption rule through fk(1) (instead
of fk(a)) because in the initial stages of the dynamics, the probability of sampling more
than one active agent is insigni￿cant in comparison with sampling just one active agent.





which depends on the out-degree distribution P(k) and the sampling process characterized




which is independent of the P￿￿in￿ uence network. Note that the di⁄usion threshold
crucially depends on the adoption rule speci￿ed by the model and therefore testing which
rules match best which applications is an important empirical question.
Beyond the di⁄usion threshold, we also analyze the endemic state of the dynamics. To
￿x ideas, we say that the adoption dynamics has reached an endemic state with a fraction
of adopters ￿￿ if this fraction of adopters remains constant in the upcoming periods. In
particular, ￿￿ is obtained as the solution of the system of equations (3) and (5) derived
before. The next result provides a necessary condition over the adoption rule for which
the endemic fraction of adopters is unique.13
12One could easily extend the results to other values of ￿. For instance, if we allow for ￿ > 1 the
in-degree distribution would be more skewed than the out-degree distribution, making high out-degree
agents have an even higher in-degree. If, instead, ￿ < 0 the correlation between out-degree and in-degree
would be negative (e.g. geniuses who listen to no one but that everybody listens to). For simplicity, we
have decided to concentrate on the values ranging between the two focal points of ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
13This result is a generalization of Proposition 1 in L￿pez-Pintado (2008a).
9Theorem 2 Consider a P￿￿ in￿uence network and an adoption rule fk(a) (weakly) con-
cave with respect to a, for all k. If ￿ > ￿
￿ there exists a unique positive endemic fraction
of adopters. Otherwise the unique endemic state is such that ￿￿ = 0. Moreover, at ￿ = ￿
￿
there exists a ￿rst order phase transition.
The skeleton of the proof is the following. Algebraic computations allow showing
that if for all k the adoption rule fk is (weakly) concave with respect to a then H￿(￿)
is an increasing and a concave function of ￿, where H￿(0) = 0. Therefore, the ￿xed
point equation ￿ = H￿(￿) has either no positive solution (when H0
￿(0) ￿ 1) or just one
positive solution (when H0
￿(0) > 1). The value of the spreading rate ￿ separating these
two cases is obtained from the equation H0
￿(0) = 1. As expected, the threshold value for
￿ obtained here coincides with the di⁄usion threshold ￿
￿ provided in Theorem 1. Due
to the continuity of H￿(￿) as a function if ￿, it is also straightforward to show that the
transition from a zero to a positive fraction of adopters occurs smoothly and thus ￿￿(￿)
converges to 0 when ￿ ! ￿
￿ (see Figure 1). This continuous transition is what we refer
to as a ￿rst order phase transition.
q











Figure 1: The graph in the left hand side represents H￿(￿) for a (weakly) concave adoption
rule when (i) ￿ equals the di⁄usion threshold ￿
￿ (ii) ￿ is above the di⁄usion threshold (￿ = ￿
￿
+)
and (iii) ￿ is below the di⁄usion threshold (￿ = ￿
￿
￿). The graph in the right hand side represents
the corresponding fraction of adopters in the endemic state ￿￿ as a function of ￿, highlighting
the ￿rst order phase transition occurring at ￿ = ￿
￿.
There are many adoption rules satisfying the concavity assumption at the statement
of Theorem 2 (e.g., the SIS and Imitation rules). Other relevant rules (e.g., fk(a) = a2
or fk(a) = (a
k)2) do not. A persuasive rule that also violates the assumption is the
deterministic threshold rule satisfying that agents adopt with probability 1 if and only if
the fraction of adopters in the sample (a
k) is above a certain threshold (see e.g., Morris,
2000, Watts, 2002, L￿pez-Pintado, 2006, L￿pez-Pintado and Watts, 2008 and Young, 2009
for papers where the deterministic threshold rule, or a slightly modi￿ed version of it, has
10been analyzed). In general, non-concave rules can exhibit multiple endemic states with
di⁄erent corresponding fraction of adopters. Moreover, continuity of ￿￿(￿) at ￿ = ￿
￿ is
not guaranteed.
3.1 The Role of the Sampling Process (￿)
One of the main objectives of this paper is to understand how di⁄usion depends on the
correlation between information and visibility. For this purpose, the next result takes as
given a certain out-degree distribution P(k) and adoption rule fk, for every k, and analyzes
how the di⁄usion threshold depends on the sampling process, characterized through the
parameter ￿.
Proposition 1 Given a P￿-in￿uence network and an adoption rule fk, for every k, the
following statements hold:
(i) If kfk(1) is increasing with respect to k the di⁄usion threshold decreases with ￿.
(ii) If kfk(1) is decreasing with respect to k the di⁄usion threshold increases with ￿.
(iii) If kfk(1) is constant with respect to k, the di⁄usion threshold does not depend on
￿.
The distinction between a visible (or in￿ uential) agent and an easily in￿uenced agent is
crucial for understanding the proposition. Note that, it is obviously the case that di⁄usion
will be enhanced whenever in￿ uential agents are also easily in￿ uenced. The ￿rst simply
refers to agents that are sampled by many others (i.e., have high in-degrees), whereas
the second refers to agents that are early adopters of the dynamics. Whether an agent
is or not an early adopter depends on two features. On one hand, the out-degree k (i.e.,
how many agents somebody observes) determines the chances of ￿nding an adopter. On
the other hand, the adoption rule fk speci￿es the probability of becoming an adopter
given the composition of the sample. As Proposition 1 suggests kfk(1) (a joint measure
of both features) is roughly the rate at which an agent with degree k adopts in the initial
(and crucial for determining future success) stages of the adoption dynamics. Proposition
1 does not characterize all possible adoption rules but points out the existence of two
distinctive types of rules: the ones where early adopters are agents with high out-degrees,
and the ones where early adopters are agents with low out-degree (cases (i) and (ii)
respectively in the proposition). If high out-degree agents adopt early on, then di⁄usion
is helped if these agents are also in￿ uential which occurs precisely for higher values of ￿.
On the contrary, if high out-degree agents adopt later on, then di⁄usion is helped if these
11agents are less in￿ uential (i.e., for low values of ￿). Finally, case (iii) in the proposition
corresponds to rules in which adopting early on or not is independent of the out-degree
and consequently independent on ￿.
There are examples of adoption rules in each of the cases established by Proposition 1.
For instance, all viral adoption rule satisfy (i). Some persuasive adoption rules, however,
as for example the rule fk(a) = (a
k)2, satisfy (ii), whereas, other persuasive rules, such as
the Imitation rule (i.e., fk(a) = a
k), satisfy (iii).14
To further investigate the e⁄ect of the sampling process on di⁄usion, the next result
assumes a certain out-degree distribution P(k) and a concave adoption rule fk, for all k,
and analyzes how the endemic fraction of adopters depends on ￿. Note that, the (unique)
endemic fraction of adopters is ￿￿: = 0 for values of the spreading rate below the di⁄usion
threshold, and it is the unique positive solution ￿￿ of the system of equations determined
by (3) and (5) whenever the spreading rate is above the di⁄usion threshold.
Proposition 2 Given a P￿￿ in￿uence network and an adoption rule fk(a) (weakly) con-
cave with respect to a, for every k, the following statements hold:
(i) If, for all ￿ 2 [0;1], rk(￿) is increasing with respect to k, the endemic fraction of
adopters ￿￿ increases with respect to ￿.
(ii) If, for all ￿ 2 [0;1], rk(￿) is decreasing with respect to k for all ￿ 2 [0;1], the
endemic fraction of adopters ￿￿ decreases with respect to ￿.
(iii) If, for all ￿ 2 [0;1], rk(￿) is constant with respect to k for all ￿ 2 [0;1], the
endemic fraction of adopters ￿￿ does not depend on ￿.
Recall that rk(￿) is the rate at which an individual with out-degree k adopts as a
function of ￿. For values of ￿ in￿nitely small rk(￿) can be approximated by kfk(1), which
is the relevant measure used in the computation of the di⁄usion threshold and the results
obtained in Proposition 1. Regarding the endemic fraction of adopters, conditions on
rk(￿) must hold for all values of ￿ which leads to the above result.
As a consequence of Proposition 2 one ￿nds that all (concave) viral adoption rules
satisfy (i) in the proposition and thus, the fraction of adopters in the endemic state
14An illustration of how the adoption rule fk(a) = (a
k)2 could be derived is the following. Assume
agents obtain utility 0 if they decide not to adopt the new behavior and a utility of u(a) = (a
k)2 ￿ c if
they decide to adopt, where a
k is the fraction of adopters in the sample and c is the cost of adopting.




12increases with the (positive) correlation between out-degree and visibility.15 The Imitation
rule, however, satis￿es (iii) and thus, the fraction of adopters in the endemic state is
independent of ￿. Indeed, for such a case, it is straightforward to show that ￿￿ = 0 if
￿ ￿ 1 and ￿￿ = 1 ￿ 1
￿ otherwise.
3.2 The Role of the out-degree Distribution (P(k))
Another aspect of the model that has been the focus of most of the related literature is the
e⁄ect on the di⁄usion outcomes of variations in the out-degree distribution. Does having
more information about the behavior of others help or harm di⁄usion? Does heterogeneity
favor di⁄usion? These questions are partially answered in the following section. To do
so, we take as given the ￿-sampling process and compare populations with di⁄erent out-
degree distributions. We denote by ￿
￿(P￿) the di⁄usion threshold obtained for a certain
P￿￿in￿ uence network.
Proposition 3 Given two in￿uence networks f P￿ and P￿ and an adoption rule fk, for
every k, the following statements hold:
(i) If e P(k) First Order Stochastic Dominates P(k) and k￿+1fk(1) is decreasing with
respect to k then ￿
￿(P￿) ￿ ￿
￿(f P￿)
(ii) If e P(k) is a Mean Preserving Spread of P(k) and k￿+1fk(1) is convex with respect
to k then ￿
￿(f P￿) ￿ ￿
￿(P￿)
The ￿rst part of Proposition 3 suggests, contrary to the basic intuition, that for certain
adoption rules the lower the density of the in￿ uence network the easier it is to spread
the behavior in the population. Note that the result applies to some convex adoption
rules such as fk(a) = (a
k)2 for which early adopters coincide with low out-degree agents,
whereas all viral rules, as well as other persuasive rules (e.g., the Imitation rule), are not
contemplated in this result. The counterpart of (i) where ￿
￿(P￿) > ￿
￿(f P￿), although more
intuitive, is not straightforward to show. Indeed Jackson and Rogers (2007) concentrate
on the SIS model and ￿nd support for such inequality if in addition to e P(k) FOSD P(k)
it also holds that 1
hki e P
k e P(k) FOSD 1
hkiP kP(k).
As for the second part of the proposition, note that, there are many adoption rules
that satisfy the condition provided therein . In particular, all viral adoption rules, as well
as a large number of persuasive rules (including the Imitation rule, among others) satisfy







￿a(1￿￿)(k￿a) is increasing as a function of
k since f(a) is an increasing function of a.
13the convexity of k￿+1fk(1). Here, we compare in￿ uence networks with the same average
out-degree but with di⁄erent variance. We ￿nd that, for a large range of adoption rules,
the di⁄usion threshold is lower for networks with larger variance.16
3.2.1 The Homogeneous-Visibility Case (￿ = 0)
In order to obtain further comparative statics results we have concentrated on the case
of ￿ = 0 which is signi￿cantly simpler than the remaining cases where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1. The
reason is that, in such a case, the value of ￿ (probability of sampling an adopter) coincides








and, if fk(a) is a concave function of a, for every k, the endemic fraction of adopters ￿￿ is








All agents are now equally in￿ uential and thus heterogeneity among them is only due
to the amount of information they have about the behavior of others. The following
propositions explain the e⁄ect on the di⁄usion threshold of a FOSD shift and a MPS of
the out-degree distribution.
Proposition 4 Given two in￿uence networks f P0 and P0, where e P(k) FOSD P(k), and
an adoption rule f, the following statements hold:
(i) if kfk(1) is increasing with respect to k then ￿
￿(f P0) ￿ ￿
￿(P0)
(ii) if kfk(1) is decreasing with respect to k then ￿
￿(P0) ￿ ￿
￿(e P0)
(iii) if kfk(1) is constant with respect to k then ￿
￿(f P0) = ￿
￿(P0)
Proposition 5 Given two in￿uence networks f P0 and P0, where e P(k) is a MPS of P(k),
and an adoption rule fk, the following statements hold:
(i) if kfk(1) is convex with respect to k then ￿
￿(f P0) ￿ ￿
￿(P0)
(ii) if kfk(1) is concave with respect to k then ￿
￿(P0) ￿ ￿
￿(e P0)
(iii) if kfk(1) is linear with respect to k then ￿
￿(f P0) = ￿
￿(P0)
16The result that heterogeneity in the network enhances di⁄usion can be considered as a generalization
of the main ￿nding in the mean-￿eld model presented by Pastor-SatorrÆs and Vespignani (2001), who
focused on the SIS adoption rule and the case ￿ = 1.
14Note that all viral adoption rules satisfy conditions (i) and (iii) in Propositions 4
and 5, respectively. Therefore, the higher the density of the in￿ uence network the lower
its di⁄usion threshold. Moreover, two populations with the same average out-degree
but di⁄erent variance have the same di⁄usion threshold since ￿
￿ = 1
f(1)hki. Regarding
persuasive adoption rules, further properties of the rule are necessary in order to determine
the results. For example, when fk(a) =
p
(a
k), the higher the density of the network the
lower the di⁄usion threshold whereas the opposite holds when fk(a) = (a
k)2. Furthermore,
for the adoption rule fk(a) =
p
(a
k) the higher the variance, the higher the di⁄usion
threshold whereas the opposite holds when fk(a) = (a
k)2.
In addition, we also analyze the e⁄ect of varying the out-degree distribution on the
endemic state. To this end, denote by ￿￿(P￿) to the endemic fraction of adopters obtained
for a P￿￿in￿ uence network .
Proposition 6 Given two in￿uence networks f P0 and P0, where e P(k) FOSD P(k), and
a (weakly) concave adoption rule fk(a) with respect to a, for every k, the following state-
ments hold:
(i) If rk(￿) is increasing with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(P0) ￿ ￿￿(e P0)
(ii) If rk(￿) is decreasing with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(f P0) ￿ ￿￿(P0)
(iii) If rk(￿) is constant with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(e P0) = ￿￿(P0)
Proposition 7 Given two in￿uence networks f P0 and P0, where e P(k) is a MPS of P(k),




1+￿rk(￿) is convex with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(P0) ￿ ￿￿(e P0)
(ii) If
￿rk(￿)
1+￿rk(￿) is concave with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(f P0) ￿ ￿￿(P0)
(iii) If
￿rk(￿)
1+￿rk(￿) is linear with respect to k for any ￿ 2 [0;1] then ￿￿(e P0) = ￿￿(P0) .
Viral adoption rules satisfy (i) in Proposition 6 and thus the higher the density of the
in￿ uence network, the higher the endemic fraction of adopters. Regarding the e⁄ect of a
MPS of the out-degree distribution for viral adoption rules, the result is not conclusive
and depends on the further properties of the rule. Nevertheless, for the speci￿c case of
the SIS rule it is straightforward to show that it satis￿es (ii) in Proposition 7 and thus,
the higher the variance of the out-degree distribution, the lower the endemic fraction of
the adopters. Figure 2 summarizes the qualitative results obtained for the SIS rule, both
regarding the di⁄usion threshold and the endemic fraction of adopters. The SIS rule
when ￿ = 1 has been previously analyzed by Pastor-SatorrÆs and Vespignani (2001) and
15Jackson and Rogers (2007). If one compares the two extreme cases (￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0), the
more striking di⁄erence is that homogeneity in the out-degree distribution increases the
endemic fraction of adopters for all values of ￿ when ￿ = 0, whereas it, instead, decreases
the endemic fraction of adopters (at least for low range of values of ￿) when ￿ = 1. The
intuition for such a result is the following. The SIS rule is such that (alike all viral rules)
agents with high out-degree are more easily in￿ uenced. In fact the rate of adoption at
any given moment in time rk(￿) is increasing with k. Due to the concavity of rk(￿) as
a function of k the e⁄ect of having high out-degree exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
This leads to the result that a population where all agents have roughly the same average
degree helps di⁄usion more than a more heterogeneous out-degree distribution. In the case
￿ = 1 the argument does not follow since agents with a high out-degree are particularly
valuable for spreading the product; not only they adopt early but also once they adopt,
they are very in￿ uential and spread the infection further. This second advantageous e⁄ect
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Figure 2: The graphs plot the endemic fraction of adopters ￿￿ as a function of the spreading
rate ￿, focusing on the e⁄ects of a FOSD shift (graph on the left) and a MPS (graph on the
right) of the degree distribution for the SIS adoption rule and ￿ = 0.
4 Concluding Remarks
Nowadays, more complex in￿ uence structures have replaced traditional patterns generated
exclusively through standard personal interactions. We have proposed in this paper a
17These results resemble those found by Galeotti and Goyal (2009). For instance, analogously to
Propositions 4 and 5, they also ￿nd that if the adoption rate is an increasing (decreasing) function of
the out-degree a FOSD shift of the out-degree distribution would increase (decrease) the pro￿ts of the
￿rm wanting to spread the new product. Moreover, similarly to what we ￿nd in Propositions 6 and 7,
they ￿nd that if the adoption rate is convex (concave) with respect to out-degree, a MPS would increase
(decrease) the pro￿ts of the ￿rm.
16stylized model to analyze some of the implications of such complexities. We have modeled
the in￿ uence structure by means of an explicit sampling process characterized by the
correlation between the out-degree (information level) and in-degree (visibility level) of
agents. Surprisingly, we have observed that an increase in such a correlation may favor or
harm di⁄usion; the e⁄ect actually depends on the speci￿c details of the adoption process.
Two types of adoption rules can be singled out: those for which high out-degree agents
are the early adopters and those for which low out-degree agents are the early adopters.
In the former case, di⁄usion is eased if the high out-degree are also in￿ uential, whereas
in the latter case, the opposite holds. We have also shown that an increase in both the
level and dispersion of information has a strong impact on the results, hence questioning
the hypothesis that more dense and heterogeneous networks always favor di⁄usion.
The current work could contribute to gain further insight into the dynamics of social
processes, pointing out possible directions for empirical studies of value for understanding
di⁄usion in the real world. In￿ uence networks, however, are not formed completely at
random. Therefore, one might consider enriching our model to account for clustering
and community structures. There has already been signi￿cant work analyzing network
formation in a semi-random framework.18 The study of di⁄usion on such more realistic
networks seems to be a fertile and promising area of research.
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176 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The probability that any agent samples another agent with out-








P(k) determines the relative size of the population of agents with out-degree
h with respect to the population of agents with out-degree k. For example,
P(h)
P(k) = 2
means that the size of the population with out-degree h is twice as large as the size of
the population with out-degree k. Therefore, the expected number of links an agent with









Analogously, the expected number of links an agent with out-degree k receives from agents








and so on and so forth.














This lemma is used in the proof of the following theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1: If an active agent is observed by another agent in an in￿ uence
network, we say that there is an active link between them. It is not di¢ cult to show
(with the help of Lemma 1) that the expected number of new active links generated by













hki is the probability that an agent, say j, sampling an initial adopter has out-
degree k and ￿fk(1) is the rate at which this agent adopts. While this agent is active
(i.e., during an interval of time equal to 1
￿) the number of new active links generated on
18average is k￿
hk￿ihki, which is the average number of individuals sampling agent j since j
has out-degree k. Therefore, the number of new active links originated by one active link







To complete the proof let us show that di⁄usion occurs if and only if condition (8) holds.
Consider the discrete approximation of the dynamics. Let us show that if there is di⁄usion
then condition (8) must hold, or analogously, that if condition (8) does not hold there is
no di⁄usion. Assume that initially there is a ￿nite number of adopters N0 and let i be
one of them. Let ri
0 be the number of individuals in￿ uenced by this initial adopter (i.e., in
period 0). Note that ri
0 is also the number of active links generated by this initial adopter.
If condition (8) does not hold then the expected number of active links generated by i
decreases with time. In a discrete version of the dynamics this implies that the number
of active links in period 1 generated by i is such that ri
0 > ri
1. The same argument is
valid to show that ri
1 > ri
2, and so on. Therefore, there must exist a period ti above which
the number of active links is zero (i.e., ri
t = 0 for all t ￿ ti). Thus, for t > maxi2N0ftig
it holds that ￿t = 0 and thus ￿￿ = 0. A similar reasoning can be used to show the
reverse implication; if condition (8) holds then ￿￿ 6= 0. In this case the sequence fri
tgt￿0
is increasing and thus converges to in￿nity.
Proof of Theorem 2: In order to ￿nd the stationary fraction of active agents ￿￿ one
must ￿rst ￿nd the stationary values of the parameter ￿, denoted by ￿
￿. Indeed, ￿￿ 6= 0 if
and only if ￿
￿ 6= 0. It is straightforward to show that 0 ￿ H(￿) < 1 for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. We
also have that H(0) = 0 which implies that ￿ = 0 is a stationary state of the dynamics
for all values of ￿. Let us now determine the values of ￿ for which there also exists a





























































a!(k ￿ a ￿ 1)!
(f(k;a + 1) ￿ fk(a))￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(k￿a￿1)
which is non-negative given condition (1) imposed on the adoption rule f. Therefore H(￿)













d2￿ (1 + ￿rk(￿)) ￿ 2(￿
drk(￿)
d￿ )2








a!(k ￿ a ￿ 1)!
(f(k;a + 1) ￿ fk(a))
(a￿(1 ￿ ￿)









(a + 1)!(k ￿ a ￿ 2)!
(f(k;a + 2) ￿ f(k;a + 1))￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(k￿a￿2)
￿
k!(k ￿ a ￿ 1)
a!(k ￿ a ￿ 1)!





((fk(a + 2) ￿ f(k;a + 1)) ￿ (f(k;a + 1) ￿ fk(a)))
k!
a!(k ￿ a ￿ 2)!
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(k￿a￿2):
Since fk(a) is concave with respect to a then
d2rk(￿)
d2￿ ￿ 0 which in turn shows that H(￿)
is concave. Finally, notice that, if H(￿) is non-decreasing and concave, there exists a




















Moreover, if ￿ ￿ ￿
￿the unique stationary value for ￿ is 0.
20Proof of Proposition 1: It is straightforward to show that ￿
￿(￿) is a continuous and
derivable function of ￿. We then demonstrate that if kf(1;k) is an increasing (decreasing)

















where for ease of notation we use hg(k)i to be
P
k g(k)P(k) for any function g(k). Let us
characterize the sign of hk￿(logk)ihk￿+1f(1;k)i ￿ hk￿ihk￿+1f(1;k)(logk)i. It is straight-
forward to show that for any given k, the coe¢ cient (multiplying) P(k)2 in the expression
hk￿(logk)ihk￿+1f(1;k)i￿hk￿ihk￿+1f(1;k)(logk)i is 0. Let us now compute the coe¢ cient























The sign of the above expression coincides with the sign of
kf(1;k) ￿ kf(1;k)
which completes the proof.












The endemic state for ￿ depends on the value of ￿. To show the monotonicity of
the ￿xed point value ￿
￿(￿) (taken as ￿xed all other primitives of the model) one must











1+￿rk(￿) is increasing (decreasing) as a function of ￿ (for all ￿ 2 [0;1]) then
￿

















21It is straightforward to show that for any given k, the coe¢ cient (multiplying) P(k)2
in the expression (8) is 0. Let us now compute the coe¢ cient of P(k)P(k) for any k 6= k.











































or analogously with the sign of
rk(￿) ￿ rk(￿)
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: Notice that if e P(k) FOSD P(k) then for any increasing function




















k￿+1 e P(k)fk(1). Both inequalities together
imply that ￿
￿(P￿) ￿ ￿(f P￿) which completes the ￿rst part of the proof.
Regarding the second part of the proof, it is the case that if e P is a MPS of P then for

























22These two inequalities together imply that ￿
￿(e P￿) ￿ ￿
￿(P￿).













k e P(k)fk(1) which implies that ￿
￿(e P￿) ￿ ￿















if kfk(1) is constant and thus ￿
￿(P￿) = ￿
￿(e P￿) in such a case.






k e P(k)fk(1) which
implies that ￿
￿(P￿) ￿ ￿















k e P(k)fk(1) if kfk(1) is
a linear function of k and thus ￿
￿(P￿) = ￿
￿(e P￿) in such a case.









Note that if rk(￿) is increasing as a function of k for all ￿ then
￿rk(￿)
1+￿rk(￿) is also an increasing












for all ￿, which in particular implies that the value of ￿ that solves equation (10) is smaller
or equal for the out-degree distribution P(k) than for e P(k). The proofs of (ii) and (iii)
go along the same lines.
Proof of Proposition 7: If
￿rk(￿)












for all ￿, which in particular implies that the value of ￿ that solves equation (10) is smaller
or equal for the out-degree distribution P(k) than for e P(k). The proofs of (ii) and (iii)
go along the same lines.
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